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ARTICLE 
JURIDICAL PRUDENCE AND THE 
TOLERATION OF EVIL: AQUINAS 
AND JOHN PAUL II 
R. MARY HAYDEN LEMMONS* 
Juridical prudence is the virtue that guides the formulation of sound 
public policy and law as well as just judicial adjudication.1 Within natural 
law jurisprudence and Catholic social thought, juridical prudence relies on 
two kinds of principles, namely, foundational principles that subordinate 
public policies, judicial rulings, and law to morality; and methodological 
principles for adjudicating difficult cases. These foundational and method-
ological principles seem to have evolved from those that emphasize the 
common good (as best exemplified by the classical jurisprudence of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas) to those that emphasize inviolable human rights (as best 
exemplified by the contemporary jurisprudence of Pope John Paul II). This 
emphasis on inviolable rights, moreover, seems to place contemporary natu-
rallaw jurisprudence at odds not only with utilitarianism and legal positiv-
ism but also with the classical tradition-insofar as that tradition permitted 
evil to be tolerated for the sake of the common good and insofar as the 
toleration of evil seems to involve a failure to protect inviolable rights. 
Determining whether the classical and contemporary forms of natural 
law jurisprudence are at odds is one of this paper's four main objectives. 
* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Catholic Studies at the University of St. Thomas. I 
wish to thank the editors of the Law Journal-especially John Darda, Jonathan Bakewicz, and 
Shannon Gherty-for their generosity and their insights. 
1. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Part I of the Second Part, q. 57 (in vol. 2 of 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947) (discussing pru-
dence) [hereinafter AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part]. In the corpus of that Question's 
Article 4, Aquinas wrote: "[p]rudence is the right reason of things to be done." (emphasis omit-
ted). See also id. at q. 65 a. 1. In Part I of the Second Part, Question 60, Article 3, Aquinas 
explained that the actions resulting from prudence constitute justice when they honor equality, the 
right, and the due: 
[J]ustice ... is ... something due to another ... according to the becomingness of the 
thing itself. . .. [W]e derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of 
justice: for, seemingly. it pertains to justice that a man give another his due .... [T]he 
nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise. or a favor 
already conferred. 
24 
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The second objective is to identify the principles that determine which evils 
are to be tolerated and which are not to be tolerated. The third and fourth 
objectives are to identify the principles that permit the toleration of evil not 
only in the formulation of policies and legislation but also in the adjudica-
tion of difficult cases. While attaining these objectives, this paper will study 
the infamous text in which Aquinas argued that in certain rare and highly 
specified conditions, a judge may issue an execution order for someone 
known by the judge to be innocent. Indeed, this case will form the litmus 
test for determining whether Aquinas' jurisprudence is irredeemably incon-
sistent and whether his common-good jurisprudence and John Paul II's in-
violable-rights jurisprudence are at odds with each other. We, however, 
shall find that contrary to a prima facie reading of Aquinas, consistency 
characterizes Aquinas' jurisprudence; that Aquinas and John Paul II would 
have agreed on the foundational and methodological principles of juridical 
prudence;2 and that the conditions necessary for tolerating the execution of 
someone known, by the judge, to be innocent have not been possible for 
several centuries. 
I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF JURIDICAL PRUDENCE: 
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE COMMON GOOD, AND EQUITY 
Natural law jurisprudence and Catholic social thought have typically 
subordinated law and public policy to morality through the notion of the 
common good: whatever advances the common good is held to be a just and 
permissible public policy, while whatever counters the common good is 
held to be an unjust and impermissible policy. This view of the common 
good is not the same as the utilitarian view of social welfare insofar as the 
utilitarian notion of social welfare is not concerned with the welfare of 
every member of society, while the notion of the common good is. Indeed, 
Aquinas' notion of the common good identified the welfare of the commu-
nity with the welfare of individuals.3 This view of the common good has 
2. One point on which Aquinas and John Paul II significantly differ is the treatment of 
heretics. John Paul II argued that freedom of religious belief is a basic right and begged forgive-
ness on the first Sunday of Lent in 2000 for past offenses against human rights. Aquinas held the 
pre-modem, cultural assumptions that political authority required, for the most part, religious con-
sensus; that Christian heretics were believers rejecting what they knew to be true; and that heretics 
were not only spiritual, but political, threats at least as dangerous as those committing the capital 
crime of counterfeiting money. 
Religious persecution is a long and sad tradition that includes the execution of Socrates, in 
part, for the failure to conform to the religious beliefs of ancient Athens. The United States broke 
with this tradition by guaranteeing the free exercise of religion in its Constitution's Bill of Rights. 
Contemporary Thomism, which strives to be a living tradition, has likewise rejected the histori-
cally conditioned assumptions that underwrote religious persecution. It argues that since these 
grossly false assumptions are not essential to Aquinas' thought, they can be discarded without 
disrupting the integrity of his thought. This paper accordingly argues that the "common good" 
jurisprudence of Aquinas obligates the state to protect the right of religious free exercise. 
3. See AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part at q. 90 a. 2. This is the key text wherein 
Aquinas subordinates every law to the common good, understood as constituted by the happiness 
26 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 4:1 
been traditionally called "organic," as organisms flourish to the extent that 
each of its members also flourish. It could also be called civic friendship or 
solidarity insofar as the welfare of individuals requires caring for neigh-
bors.4 Community life is thus never sacrificed at the expense of individual 
welfare; rather it advances as individuals flourish. Since inviolable human 
rights identify what is necessary for humans to flourish, the contemporary 
emphasis on inviolable human rights instantiates Aquinas' classical juridi-
cal notion of the common good, especially when it includes a right to free 
associations or to community life. 
This natural law understanding of the common good and of human 
rights underpins every political document that declares that individuals have 
inalienable rights, for example, the American Declaration of Independence 
or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also underpins every doc-
ument that acknowledges that legal rights do not exhaust a person's rights, 
for example, the Constitution of the United States. The identification of 
human rights as essential for the common good has become a mainstay of 
Catholic jurisprudence. Pope John xxm made this identification and Pope 
John Paul II stressed it: 
In the Encyclical Pacem in Terris, John xxm pointed out that "it 
is generally accepted today that the common good is best safe-
guarded when personal rights and duties are guaranteed. The chief 
concern of civil authorities must therefore be to ensure that these 
rights are recognized, respected, coordinated, defended and pro-
moted, and that each individual is enabled to perform his duties 
more easily."5 
The importance that John Paul II placed on inviolable rights is hard to un-
derstate: he considered them to be a fundamental principle of human wel-
fare6 and a foundational principle of democracy.7 For this reason, the 
United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights was characterized 
of every individual. See also id. at q. 96 a. 6 ("[E]very law is directed to the common weal of men, 
and derives the force and nature of law accordingly."). 
4. The notion that civic or political friendship is the end of the state was argued by Aris-
totle. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1155a24-26 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 
1985). See also id. at 1159b25-31, 1161alO-1l61blO, 1167a23-1167b3. See also AQUINAS, 
SUMMA, supra note 1, at q. 99 a. 1 ad 2 ("[E]very law aims at establishing friendship, either 
between man and man, or between man and God."); MICHAEL PAKALUK, THE CHANGING FACE OF 
FRIENDSHIP 197-212 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., U. of Notre Dame 1994) (arguing the importance of 
this kind of friendship for America). 
5. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, No. 71 (Mar. 25, 1995), reprinted in POPE JOHN 
PAUL II, THE GosPEL OF LIFE: EVANGELIUM VITAE 131 (Pauline Books and Media 1995). 
6. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris Hominis, No. 17 (Mar. 4, 1979), reprinted in POPE JOHN 
PAUL II, THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 74-75 (J. Michael Miller ed., Our Sunday Visitor 
Publishing Division 1996). 
7. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, No. 47 (May 1, 1991), reprinted in POPE JOHN 
PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM 65 
(Daughters of St. Paul ed., Pauline Books and Media 1991). 
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by John Paul II as "one of the highest expressions of the human conscience 
of our time."8 
This emphasis on inviolable rights establishes a key natural law pa-
rameter of juridical prudence and determines whether juridical rulings are 
good or bad: good juridical rulings honor objective and inviolable rights-
especially the right to religious freedom, which John Paul II understood "as 
the right to live in the troth of one's faith and in conformity with one's 
transcendent dignity as a person."9 Or, as John Paul II said in Evangelium 
Vitae: "[Civil law is to ensure] the common good of people through the 
recognition and defence of their fundamental rights, and the promotion of 
peace and of public morality."l0 Bad juridical rulings violate fundamental 
rights, peace, and public morality. 
The inability of public policy and law to specify every necessary way 
to promote the common good and to defend in every possible way funda-
mental human rights gives rise to the obligation of equity. Aquinas ex-
plained that equity obligates judges to apply the law differently in those 
rather unique cases where strict application of the law would harm an indi-
vidual or hinder the common good. 11 To illustrate this point, Aquinas relied 
on Plato's ancient argument about borrowed weapons: 12 one ought not re-
turn borrowed weapons to their owner when their return would cause 
8. Pope John Paul n, Address of His Holiness Pope John Paul n to the Fiftieth General 
Assembly of the United Nations Organization II No.2 (Oct. 5, 1995). 
9. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, supra note 7, at No. 47, p. 67. 
lO. Pope John Paul n, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 71, p. 130 (citation omitted). 
In Centesimus Annus, supra note 7, at No. 47, p. 66, John Paul emphasizes some of these funda-
mental rights: 
Among the most important of these rights, mention must be made of the right to life, an 
integral part of which is the right of the child to develop in the mother's womb from the 
moment of conception; the right to live in a united family and in a moral environment 
conducive to the growth of the child's personality; the right to develop one's intelli-
gence and freedom in seeking and knowing the truth; the right to share in the work 
which makes wise use of the earth's material resources, and to derive from that work the 
means to support oneself and one's dependents; and the right freely to establish a fam-
ily, to have and to rear children through the responsible exercise of one's sexuality. 
11. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOCIICA, Part II of the Second Part, q. 120 a. 1 (in vol. 3 of 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947) [hereinafter AQUI-
NAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part]. 
Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be 
applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the 
common good, which the law has in view .... In these and like cases it is bad to follow 
the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of 
justice and the common good. This is the object of epikeia which we call eqUity. 
See also AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part, at q. 97 a. 4. 
Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a 
general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either 
because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some 
evil .... Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in 
a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to 
persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. 
12. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOCIICA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 120 a. 1; see also id. at 
q. 51 a. 4. 
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harm. 13 Elsewhere, Aquinas specified that prudence and its associated vir-
tues play key roles in such cases. 14 By so doing, Aquinas identified equity 
as an instance of juridical prudence where the moral obligation of avoiding 
harm is applied in a particular case to protect an individual from an injuri-
ous application of the law. 
The harm that juridical prudence seeks to avoid includes not only indi-
vidual harms but also attacks on the common good, as demonstrated in the 
famous case of Riggs v. Palmer. 15 In Riggs, Palmer left the bulk of his 
estate to his grandson, who then murdered him with poison.16 Justice, the 
court decided, precludes allowing a grandson to profit from his crime be-
cause the common good requires crime to be adequately punished and not 
rewarded. 17 In this instance, American case law not only accorded with the 
insights of Aquinas and Pope John Paul II about the necessary relationship 
of morality and human law18 but also exemplified the judgment of juridical 
prudence. 
II. THE TOLERATION OF EVIL 
If law has its underpinnings in objective morality, it may seem that it is 
never permissible for government to tolerate harm to its citizens. To harm a 
citizen is to attack the common good that the state is obligated to protect. 
Nevertheless, John Paul II approvingly cited Thomas Aquinas' maxim that 
prudence precludes the human law from prohibiting all evils. 19 A certain 
degree of harm must be tolerated, otherwise the burden on those not yet 
13. PLATO, REPuBuc 33lc (Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey 
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1961). 
14. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part [ of the Second Part, at q. 57 a. 6; see also AQUINAS, SUMMA, 
Part II of the Second Part at q. 50-51. As Aquinas stated in SUMMA THEOLOGlCA, Part II of the 
Second Part, at Question 56, Article 2, Response 3 "All the precepts ... that relate to acts of 
justice pertain to the execution of prudence." 
15. 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). 
16. [d. at 508-09. 
17. [d. at 514. 
18. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 72, p. 131 ("The doctrine on 
the necessary conformity of civil law with the moral law is in continuity with the whole tradition 
of the Church."). Aquinas argued the point in SUMMA, Part [of the Second Part, at Question 91, 
Article 2, Response 3, by frrst establishing that natural law directs human reason to its last end: 
Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature ... for 
every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of 
appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last 
end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the 
natural law. 
Aquinas then argued in SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part, at Question 95, Article 2, that the 
justice of human law is grounded on the natural law: 
Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of 
reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature .... Consequently every human 
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if 
in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of 
law. 
19. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 71. p. 129-31. 
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virtuous would be so unbearable that they "would break out into yet greater 
evils."20 But what are the criteria for identifying whether or not an evil is 
tolerable? 
John Paul n provides some guidance in Evangelium Vitae. In that text, 
he wrote that public authority cannot tolerate abuses of the right to life.21 
He argued that this is the case within democracies: 
[T]he value of democracy stands or falls with the values which it 
embodies and promotes. Of course, values such as the dignity of 
every human person, respect for inviolable and inalienable human 
rights, and the adoption of the "common good" as the end and 
criterion regulating political life are certainly fundamental and not 
to be ignored. 
The basis of these values cannot be provisional and changeable 
"majority" opinions, but only the acknowledgment of an objective 
moral law which, as the "natural law" written in the human heart, 
is the obligatory point of reference for civil law itself.22 
There are several relevant principles enumerated in this text. First, the 
political life is to be regulated by the common good and by the fundamental 
values of human dignity and respect for inviolable and inalienable human 
rights. Second, the basis of these fundamental values is the objective moral 
law written as the natural law in every human heart. Third, the natural law 
is the necessary ground for social values, public policies, judicial rulings, 
and legislation. 
Thus, John Paul n followed the classical natural law jurisprudence that 
identifies governmental authority with the moral authority of the societal 
organic common good, rather than identifying governmental authority as 
the outcome of due process or as the utility in satisfying the majority's 
desires or coercive power. 
This identification of legal authority with moral authority enables both 
classical and contemporary natural law jurisprudence to claim that a public 
20. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part 1 of the Second Part at q. 96 a. 2. 
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not 
perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous 
abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to 
abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which 
human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and 
such like. 
21. Pope 10hn PaulD, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 71, pp. 130-31. 
While public authority can sometimes choose not to put a stop to something which-
were it prohibited-would cause more serious harm, it can never presume to legitimize 
as a right of individuals-even if they are the majority of the members of society-an 
offense against other persons caused by the disregard of so fundamental a right as the 
right to life. The legal toleration of abortion or of euthanasia can in no way claim to be 
based on respect for the conscience of others, precisely because society has the right and 
the duty to protect itself against the abuses which can occur in the name of conscience 
and under the pretext of freedom. 
(citation omitted). 
22. Pope 10hn Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 70. p. 128. 
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policy, judicial ruling, or legislative act devoid of moral authority may still 
be coercive, so long as the police or armed forces are willing to enforce it. 
Coerciveness does not suffice for legitimacy-if it did, then there would be 
no difference between the legal authority of free states and that of totalitar-
ian states. Since it is possible for coercive juridical rulings to attack and 
even corrupt the common good, John Paul II approvingly cited Aquinas' 
maxim that juridical rulings opposed to the natural law are acts of 
violence?3 
Especially pernicious, according to John Paul II, are those juridical 
rulings that permit or otherwise support abortion and euthanasia: such rul-
ings fail to protect not only human equality, but also all human rights, since 
these stem from the inviolable right to life.24 Furthermore, such rulings 
attack the common good: "Disregard for the right to life, precisely because 
it leads to the killing of the person whom society exists to serve, is what 
most directly conflicts with the possibility of achieving the common 
good."25 The common good thus obliges juridical rulings to defend the 
inviolable right to life. 
But does this obligation, for instance, forbid one from supporting leg-
islation that seeks to restrict most abortions? Does it forbid judges from 
issuing rulings that permit minors to get abortions or that condemn 
criminals to death? Such legislative and judicial cases must be distinguished 
and treated separately because the choices involved in making law differ 
from those involved in deciding law. 
III. PRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR POLICY FORMULATION: THE COMMON 
GOOD, INVIOLABLE HUMAN RIGHTS, LIFE, THE MINIMIZATION 
OF HARM, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 
The key criteria for legislative juridical prudence are taken from the 
legislators' intention and from the nature of the juridical policy or law. In 
brief, the lawmaker or juridical policymaker must not only intend to pro-
mote the common good and protect inviolable human rights, but must also 
craft legislation that actually accomplishes these goals--either totally, 
whenever possible, or partially, whenever the other is practically impossi-
ble. For instance, the attack on human life that occurs in abortion obligates 
legislators to seek to ban all forms of abortion. But since total bans are not 
23. [d. at No. 72 (citing AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part [ of the Second Part, at q. 93 a. 3, ad 2). 
24. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 72. pp. 132-33. 
[T]he fundamental right and source of all other rights . . . is the right to life, a right 
belonging to every individual. Consequently, laws which legitimatize the direct killing 
of innocent human beings through abortion or euthanasia are in complete opposition to 
the inviolable right to life proper to every individual; they thus deny the right to life 
proper to every individual; they thus deny the equality of everyone before the law .... 
Laws which authorize and promote abortion and euthanasia are therefore radically op-
posed not only to the good of the individual but also the common good; as such they are 
completely lacking in authentic juridical validity. 
25. [d. 
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possible in today's current climate, John Paul II argued that it would be 
permissible for a pro-life legislator or policymaker to support a partial ban 
on abortion?6 This argument identifies three key conditions for supporting 
more restrictive abortion laws or policies. First, the policy or law must be a 
last resort (because the political situation precludes a total ban). Second, the 
juridical ruling must be well crafted so that the number of abortions would 
actually decrease. And third, supporters must make their pro-life intentions 
known-presumably, to avoid the scandal that would arise if others were to 
perceive their support as somehow endorsing abortions in certain cases. 
Underpinning this analysis are two principles: the principle that harm 
is to be minimized and the principle of double effect. The latter principle 
was firmly established in natural law jurisprudence by Aquinas, when he 
used it to justify killing in self-defense.27 This justification identifies several 
necessary conditions that must be met before the evil resulting from an act 
can be tolerated. One of these conditions is that the one assaulted must have 
no other recourse than to strike a lethal blow; he must "retreat to the wall" 
as the American legal tradition once put it. 28 Hence, a necessary condition 
for the principle of double effect is that the act in question must be a last 
resort. When this condition is not met, the good effect can be attained by an 
act that lacks the evil effect. Accordingly, if one can save one's life by 
escaping, there is no need to strike a lethal blow. In such a situation the 
refusal to escape involves the immoral intention to pursue the evil effect. 
When, however, there are no viable alternatives, the other conditions of the 
principle of double effect establish that evil effects can be tolerated when 
the act in question also has an equal or greater good effect that alone can be 
intended. Accordingly, it is morally permissible to strike a lethal blow in 
self-defense when the lethal blow is intended not to kill the aggressor, but 
to stop the aggression. For that reason, once the aggressive act is stopped, 
the defender is obligated to call the paramedics rather than watch gleefully 
as life ebbs from the aggressor. These indispensable conditions of the prin-
ciple of double effect can be summarized as follows:29 1) the act in question 
has both good and bad effects; 2) the evil effect is not the means to the good 
effect; 3) the evil effect does not outweigh the good effect; 4) only the good 
26. Id. at No. 73, pp. 134-35. 
A particular problem of conscience can arise in cases where a legislative vote would be 
decisive for the passage of a more restrictive law, aimed at limiting the number of 
authorized abortions, in place of a more permiSSive law already passed or ready to be 
voted on .... In a case like the one just mentioned, when it is not possible to overturn or 
completely abrogate a pro-abortion law, an elected official, whose absolute personal 
opposition to procured abortion was welI known, could licitly support proposals aimed 
at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening its negative consequences at the 
level of general opinion and public morality. 
(citations omitted). 
27. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Pan II of the Second Pan, at q. 64 a. 7. 
28. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 17 Tex. Ct. App. 538 (1885). 
29. I take these conditions as establishing that the act in question is not intrinsicalIy evil. 
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effect is intended; and 5) the act in question is a last resort because there are 
no other viable options. Hence, the principle of double effect can never 
warrant genocide, for instance, since genocide cannot occur without in-
tending the evil effect of extermination and since that evil effect not only is 
the means for attaining any alleged good effect, but is also greater than any 
alleged good effect. 
The principle of double effect thus permits policies and laws to be 
formulated that have both good and evil effects when the evil effect does 
not overwhelm or cause the good effect, and when only the good effect is 
intended. Thus, it is morally permissible to support policies or laws that 
restrict, rather than ban, all abortions because it is good to restrict abortions 
and because it is possible to intend only the rather substantial good effect of 
saving some lives while tolerating the evil effect of not being able to save 
all lives. If anyone of the five conditions for the principle of double effect 
is unmet, a legislative act that produces an evil effect would not be morally 
permissible. For instance, if a policy or legislative act were to seek to re-
strict abortion by mandating vasectomies, the policy or law would be im-
moral-even if the vasectomies were reversible-since the good effect of 
eliminating the possibility of an abortion is achieved through the evil effect 
of destroying, either temporarily or permanently, the male reproductive 
capacity.30 
Juridical prudence thus identifies two principles indispensable for leg-
islators and policy makers. First, every juridical rule should protect or pro-
mote the common good and the inviolable right to life. And second, lesser 
evils should be tolerated in order to avoid greater ones only when such 
toleration is permissible according to the five-fold principle of double 
effect. 
Apart from these conditions, policies and legislative acts that tolerate 
or endorse evil should be denied support by every policymaker and citi-
zen,31 as well as protested and opposed by "conscientious objection."32 The 
reason why opposing unjust laws through conscientious objection is so im-
portant is that human beings have not only an obligation to oppose evil but 
30. The effect of such vasectomies would only be compounded if they were freely chosen by 
the patient, because then the patient would be intending, either the permanent or temporary, de-
struction of his reproductive capacity; this is to intend not only the destruction of one's bodily 
integrity, but also the very means whereby a people survives. 
3 L Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 73, p. 134 ("In the case of an 
intrinsically unjust law, such as a law permitting abortion or euthanasia, it is therefore never licit 
to obey it, or to 'take part in a propaganda campaign in favor of such a law, or vote for it."') 
(quoting Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on Procured Abortion 
No. 22 (1974», 
32. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 74, pp. 135-37. See also id. at 
No. 73, p. 133 ("Abortion and euthanasia are thus crimes which no human law can claim to 
legitimize. There is no obligation in conscience to obey such laws; instead there is a grave and 
clear obligation to oppose them by conscientious objection."). 
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also, as John Paul II reminds us, an essential right not to do evil. 33 This 
right is nothing less than the right to act justly: it is the very heart of juris-
prudence and humane action. This right needs to be protected by laws that 
allow public officials and others, such as pharmacists, doctors, nurses, and 
hospital officials to practice the right of conscientious objection.34 
But what should one do when conscientious objection is not an option? 
In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II argued that no one can formally cooper-
ate in another's evil and that all should be willing to follow the example of 
the Egyptian midwives who refused to obey Pharaoh's law requiring them 
to kill all newborn males.35 "[F]ormal cooperation," John Paul II continued 
in Evangeliam Vitae, "occurs when an action, either by its very nature or by 
the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be defined as a direct participa-
tion in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral inten-
tion of the person committing it. "36 John Paul II included within the 
parameters of juridical prudence the proscription of directly participating in 
the killing of an innocent as well as the proscription of sharing in another's 
immoral intention. The disjunction here is not exclusive: the language of 
"direct participation" means that the case is beyond the scope of the princi-
ple of double effect. For no one can directly participate in the killing of the 
innocent without intending the innocent's death. 
IV. PRUDENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF ADJUDICATION 
AND MATERIAL COOPERATION 
Judges sometimes must adjudicate situations where they must apply 
law that permits evil. Could such an act be morally permissible? On the one 
hand, it involves cooperating with a law that permits an evil effect, for 
instance, divorce. On the other hand, such cooperation furthers the rule of 
law and may well also further the well-being of children or spouses. So it 
seems that the principle of double effect would permit the judge to intend 
the good effect while tolerating the evil effect and issue the decree. Indeed, 
33. Id. at No. 74, pp. 136-37. 
To refuse to take part in cOmmitting an injustice is not only a moral duty; it is also a 
basic human right. Were this not so, the human person would be forced to perform an 
action intrinsically incompatible with human dignity, and in this way human freedom 
itself, the authentic meaning and purpose of which are found in its orientation to the true 
and the good, would be radically compromised. What is at stake therefore is an essential 
right which, precisely as such, should be acknowledged and protected by civil law. In 
this sense, the opportunity to refuse to take part in the phases of consultation, prepara-
tion and execution of these acts against life should be guaranteed to physicians, health-
care personnel, and directors of hospitals, clinics and convalescent facilities. Those who 
have recourse to conscientious objection must be protected not only from legal penalties 
but also from any negative effects on the legal, disciplinary, financial and professional 
plane. 
34. Id. 
3S. Id. at No. 73, p. 134 (referencing Exodus 1:17 in THE NEW AMERICAN BIBLE S9 (1987)). 
36. Id. at No. 74, p. 136. 
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in his address to the Roman Rota on January 28, 2002,37 John Paul II ar-
gued that while all should avoid cooperating with the evil of divorce, it is 
permissible for lawyers to cooperate with those clients who are seeking 
divorce for reasons other than a rejection of the indissoluble sacramental 
bond, for instance, to protect the custody of children or to protect an inberi-
tance as noted in the Catholic Catechism.38 He also argued that judges may 
cooperate with unjust divorce laws, "since the legal order does not recog-
nize a conscientious objection to exempt them from giving sentence. For 
grave and proportionate motives they may therefore act in accord with the 
traditional principles of material cooperation."39 The absence of the right to 
conscientious objection would presumably be tantamount to those situations 
where recusal is not possible and the judge is left with no alternative but to 
issue a decision because he lacks the authority to declare the unjust law 
unconstitutional.40 Under these conditions, issuing a decision would be a 
judge's last resort and the principle of material cooperation would be noth-
ing other than an instantiation of the principle of double effect.41 
37. Pope John Paul II, To the Prelate Auditors, Officials and Advocates of the Tribunal of the 
Roman Rota, No.9 (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Pope John Paul II, Rota Address], available at 
http://www.vatican.valholy 3ather/john_pauUilspeecheS/2oo2/january/documents/hfjp-iUpe_ 
200201 28_roman-rota_en.html. 
38. Catechism of the Catholic Church: Modifications from the Editio Typica No. 2383 (2d 
ed., U.S. Catholic Conf. 1997). 
39. Pope John Paul II, Rota Address, supra note 37. 
40. Fortunately, within the United States, it is not too difficult for judges to declare laws 
unconstitutional. For instance, a municipal judge in Austin recently declared unconstitutional the 
city ordinance forbidding the solicitation of "services, employment, business or contributions from 
an occupant of a motor vehicle." National Coalition for the Homeless, A Dream Denied: The 
Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/ 
crimreportlcasesummaries_2.html (last accessed Mar. 26, 2007) (see case summary entitled "State 
of Texas v. John Francis Curran, No. 553926 (Tex. Mun. Ct. City of Austin 2005)"). The sum-
mary states that: 
[d. 
In 2003, the Austin police issued John Curran a $500 ticket for holding a sign asking for 
donations at a downtown intersection. Curran is a homeless man represented by Legal 
Services Corporation grantee Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid. Although Curran did not 
contest his guilt, he fought the ticket on constitutional grounds. The ordinance, under 
which the police issued the ticket, prohibited people from soliciting 'services, employ-
ment, business or contributions from an occupant of a motor vehicle.' The municipal 
court judge declared the city ordinance prohibiting panhandling to be unconstitutional 
because the law violates the First Amendment, explaining that it is not 'narrowly tai-
lored in time, place, and manner.' The city, which admits it enacted the law to stop day 
laborers from soliciting jobs, is deciding whether to appeal. 
41. Neither the Catechism nor John Paul II explicates the traditional principles of material 
cooperation. But here is a typical account given by Thomas J. Higgins, S.J.: 
In material co-operation one does not join the principal agent in his evil intent but never-
theless assists him by an act not in itself wrong. Thus one student gives notes to another 
who will use them to cheat in an examination. The general law of morality is that man 
must avoid evil as far as he can and the specific law of charity bids him to prevent his 
neighbor from doing wrong to the best of his ability [and, to the extent-that prevention 
does not cause greater evils]. [Accordingly,] ... the principle of double effect may be 
applied. Since the material cooperator does not intend the evil of the principal's act, 
whenever his own act is good or indifferent and he has a proportionately grave reason 
for acting, his cooperation will be licit. 
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John Paul II, however, was not clear on whether a judge who could 
either recuse himself or appeal to conscientious objection must do so, or 
whether it would be morally permissible to use the principle of double ef-
fect or material cooperation to issue a decision. The principle of double 
effect or material cooperation permits the judge to issue such a sentence 
only when overall the legal system is just and when a significant good ef-
fect cannot be attained without tolerating the evil effect. 
However, in cases where the rule of law is absent or tyrannical, mate-
rial cooperation is not possible. Material cooperation is especially imper-
missible under tyrannies in capital cases; because the only good that can 
result from the judge's cooperation with the tyranny's unjust laws in the 
sentencing of an innocent person is the judge's livelihood-a rather insig-
nificant good in relation to two great evils: acting as an agent of an evil 
regime and attacking the common good by intentionally sentencing an inno-
cent to die. 
But what is a judge to do when the law is just and he has private 
information that enables him to know that the defendant has been wrongly 
convicted? Can the principle of material cooperation permit the judge to 
sentence an innocent person to death? On the one hand, it does not seem 
that the judge has many alternatives: private information has no standing in 
court as judges are to issue their decisions according to the evidence given 
in the trial. Moreover, if a judge can issue a decree of divorce without in-
tending the evil of divorce, it would seem that a judge could knowingly 
condemn the innocent to death without also intending it.42 On the other 
hand, the lies of witnesses should be exposed in the well-run courtroom. It 
is also a misuse of law to allow false testimony to condemn an innocent to 
death insofar as protecting an innocent's inviolable right to life is essential 
to the rule of law. This means that capital cases differ from divorce cases in 
a critical aspect, namely, the execution of the innocent violates a key raison 
d'etre of law. Since human law exists for the sake of a common good that 
cannot exist apart from the innocent lives of individuals, it seems that there 
is no way that sentencing the innocent to death can be anything other than a 
fundamental attack on the common good. 
Nevertheless, in an infamous text that seems directly opposed to natu-
ral law jurisprudence, Aquinas argued that such a sentence is permissible 
under certain rare and strict conditions: 
THOMAS J. HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN; THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHICS, 353 (1949). See also 
AUSTIN FAGOTHEY, S.J., RIGHT AND REASON: ETHICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (6th ed. 1976). 
42. The distinction between foreknowledge of an act's effects and intending those effects 
depends upon the distinction between intellect and will that enables things to be known without 
being intended. For instance, one can foresee that helping the baby to learn how to walk will 
enable the baby to fall without also intending that the infant fall. We have seen how the principle 
of double effect specifies the conditions whereby a bad effect can be foreseen and tolerated with-
out also being intended. 
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If the judge knows that a man who has been convicted by false 
witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses 
with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent; 
but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a 
higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he 
pronounces sentence in accordance with evidence, for it is not he 
that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be 
gUilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has con-
demned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable 
error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the 
executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injus-
tice, he does not sin by carrying out the sentence, because he has 
not right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who 
slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.43 
This is a most curious text. First of all, it deals with a scenario that no 
longer occurs in liberal democracies: contemporary judges can always re-
cuse themselves or remit a case to another court. In the past, however, such 
was not always true. Case adjudication was frequently a duty of ancient or 
medieval rulers who lacked the option of recusaL Secondly, the text claims 
that when the judge cannot acquit the innocent, it is the false witness who 
puts the innocent to death. The text also claims that the judge-not the 
executioner-slays the innocent person when there is no obvious inexcus-
able error. These claims seem to be at odds with each other. We thus ask 
whether the judge is responsible for the slaying of the innocent person. The 
answer embedded in this text seems to be that the judge is responsible only 
if he commits an inexcusable error-that is, only if the judge could have 
been more like Daniel44 and could have found a way to acquit the innocent 
defendant, but failed to do so. 
The third curious aspect of this infamous text is that it claims that the 
judge must pronounce sentence according to public evidence and not on the 
basis of private information; presumably, because he would otherwise be 
attacking the rule of law. And so, it may seem that Aquinas was saying that 
for the sake of the rule of law, the judge may act against his private knowl-
edge and sentence the innocent man to death.4s After all, Aquinas did say: 
"In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from 
his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority, he must 
form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the 
public judicial procedure."46 To argue that conscience may be private or 
public and that public officials should defer to judgments of public con-
43. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 64 a. 6, ad 3. 
44. Daniel was able to exonerate Susanna by his vigorous cross-examination of lying wit-
nesses. Note to Daniel 13:45-61 in THE NEW AMERICAN BIBLE 933 (1987). 
45. RUSSELL HrrrINGER, THE FIRST GRACE: REDlSCOVERING THE NATURAL LAW IN A POST-
CHRISTIAN WORLD 104-05 (2003). 
46. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 67 a. 2. ad 4. 
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science over those of his or her private conscience suggests to the contem-
porary reader that moral knowledge is to be removed from the public realm. 
Moreover, when this text is combined with the text permitting the capital 
sentencing of the innocent person, it may seem that Aquinas was· arguing 
not only that judges should not allow their moral sensibilities to interfere 
with their public duties, but also that the law legitimately requires such a 
wall of separation between morality and judicial judgment. 
But if Aquinas were to actually hold these positions and champion 
such a wall, he would have been a proceduralist and a utilitarian willing to 
kill the individual for the sake of the system,47 rather than a natural law 
theorist and absolutist. Aquinas would have then grossly contradicted his 
own teaching that the state may never intentionally kill the innocent per-
son.48 He would have also fundamentally disagreed with John Paul II, who 
argued that any law "which violates an innocent person's natural right to 
life is unjust and, as such, is not valid as law."49 
For John Paul II, the demands of morality bind every individual, in-
cluding the public authority. In his own words: 
The fundamental moral rules of social life thus entail specific de-
mands to which both public authorities and citizens are required 
to pay heed. Even though intentions may sometimes be good, and 
circumstances frequently difficult, civil authorities and particular 
individuals never have the authority to violate the fundamental 
and inviolable rights of the human person. 50 
Ultimately, the reason why John Paul II asserted morality'S relevance for 
public conscience is that he saw a stark disjunction between a society 
whose values are established by an objective morality and a society whose 
values are established by the powerful-who may then catapult a democ-
racy into totalitarianism.51 In Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II argued that 
within democracies, the denial of objective truths establishes the supremacy 
of the majority's will and requires individuals to deny their consciences and 
act according to a law exemplifying ethical relativism. 52 Within such a de-
mocracy, there could be no inviolable rights and individuals would become 
47. See Matthew J. Kelly & George Schedler, St. Thomas and the Judicial Killing of the 
Innocent, 1 JOURNAL OF THOUGHT 17 (1979). 
48. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q .. 64 a. 6. 
49. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at No. 90, p. 160. 
50. Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, No. 97 (Aug. 6, 1993). available at http://www. 
newadvent.orgllibrary/docsjp02vs.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
51. Pope John Paul n, Centesimus Annus, supra note 7, at No. 46, p. 65 
Authentic democracy is possible only in a State ruled by law, and on the basis of a 
correct conception of the human person .... Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that 
agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and the basic attitude which 
correspond to democratic forms of political life .... It must be observed in this regard 
that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and 
convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a 
democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism .. 
52. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at Nos. 69-70, pp. 125-26. 
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simply fodder for the majority's will. Hence, according to John Paul II, free 
societies require a rule of law that acknowledges both objective morality 
and inviolable human rights. 
Aquinas would have concurred with John Paul II's argument that there 
is no justice apart from objective morality and natural law. And Aquinas 
would have concurred that human rights cannot be abrogated by govern-
ments, since Aquinas identified human rights as naturally commensurate to 
human nature.53 Aquinas, moreover, argued not only that human law is 
either derived or determined from the natural moral law, 54 but also that 
conscience is a moral judgment whereby moral nonns are applied to partic-
ular judgments of fact. 55 For instance, if conscience were to decide that 
taking a particular car would be unjust, it would be combining a judgment 
of fact, namely, that the owner of the car would not give permission for one 
to take it, with a moral nonn, namely, that taking another's possessions 
without pennission commits the injustice of theft. 
53. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 57 a. 1-3. In AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA, Part I of the Second Part, at Question 94, Article 2, Aquinas identifies the naturally 
commensurate as the object of a natural inclination. He divides these natural inclinations into three 
classifications: namely, the inclination common to all things, e.g., self-preservation; the inclina-
tions that humans share with the aniInals, e.g., procreation and the education of offspring; and the 
inclinations pertaining to reason, e.g., to live in community and to seek the truth about God. These 
inclinations are considered basic and the ground of other inclinations; for instance, the inclination 
towards self-preservation grounds the inclination towards food, drink, and shelter. Furthermore, 
according to the definition of natural rights given in AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, 
at Question 57, Article 3 as that which is "by its very nature ... adjusted to or commensurate with 
another person," the objects of all the inclinations enumerated in Part I of the Second Part, at 
Question 94, Article 2 are natural rights, namely, life, procreation, parental education of children, 
living in community, and religious exploration. 
Natural law morality obligates that these rights be protected and that their contraries be 
avoided; hence, for instance, murder and sterilization as a means of population control are im-
moral. Natural law morality, however, does not obligate that each of these goods always be pur-
sued; hence, it is not immoral to seek to save another's life at the cost of one's own as long as one 
does so without intending one's own death. For an extensive and definitive argument that Aqui-
nas' view of rights anticipates the modern view see BRIAN TIERNEY, THE IDEA OF NATURAL 
RIGHTS: STUDIES ON NATURAL RIGHTS, NATURAL LAW AND CHURCH LAW, 1150-1625 (1997). 
54. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part, at q. 95 a. 2. 
[H]uman law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of 
nature .... But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in 
two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of 
certain generalities .... Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of 
the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g., that one must not kill may be derived as a 
conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man: while some are de-
rived therefrom by way of determination; e.g., the law of nature has it that the evil-doer 
should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the 
law of nature. 
(empbasis added). 
55. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part, at q. 79 a. 13 (in vol. I of Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Brothers 1947); AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the 
Second Part, at q. 19 q. 5-6; THOMAS AQUINAS, THE DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON Thurn at q. 17 a. 
1-5 (in vol. 2 of James V. McGlynn, S.J. trans., Henry Regnery Co. 1953) [hereinafter AQUINAS, 
DISPUTED QUESTIONS ON Thurn]. 
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The natural law origin of Aquinas' jurisprudence renders ambiguous 
the text where Aquinas differentiated private conscience from public con-
science because this text fails to identify whether the differences between 
public and private conscience lay in some judgment of fact or in the utiliza-
tion of different moral principles. Fortunately, this text occurs in the Summa 
Theologica. The Summa divides its articles into questions formatted in the 
popular medieval style of a disputed question. This format separates objec-
tions and responses to those objections from the body of the author's argu-
ments. As a result, responses to objections are to be understood in light of 
the article's corpus. Since the text differenting public and private con-
sciences is a reply to an objection, the controlling text is the body of the 
article, which states: 
[I]t is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he 
exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be 
based on information acquired by him, not ... as a private indi-
vidual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter 
knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular-in 
general through the public laws, . . . in some particular matter, 
through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of infor-
mation .... 56 
This text not only requires judges to rely on public knowledge, but also 
identifies divine and human laws as sources of public knowledge and con-
science. But since human law relies on the natural moral law for its princi-
ples, Aquinas not only placed morality in the public realm, but also 
identified morality as a juridical principle. After all, the Thomistic philoso-
phy of law denies that immoral laws bind the conscience because they can-
not be based on the natural law.57 Hence, it would be inconsistent for 
Aquinas to have argued that judges ought to ignore their knowledge of the 
natural law when they are knowingly condemning the innocent to die. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that Aquinas was simply inconsistent on 
this point. Indeed, the case for inconsistency gains its greatest strength from 
the text wherein Aquinas clearly stated "that it is in no way lawful to slay 
the innocent."58 Aquinas explicitly argued that it is wicked to intentionally 
kill the innocent: 
56. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 67 a. 2. 
57. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part, at q. 95 a. 2 ("Consequently every human 
law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any 
point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law."). See also id. 
at q. 96 a. 4 ("Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. IT they be just, they have the power of 
binding in conscience."). 
58. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 64 a. 6. 
An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in rela-
tion to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, 
since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has 
made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above (a. 2) the 
slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted 
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Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he 
who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one who he 
should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: sec-
ondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserv-
ing of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, 
because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, 
because he despises God more, according to Luke x. 16: He that 
despiseth you despiseth Me. 59 
Furthermore, Aquinas stated: "Now no man ought to injure a person un-
justly, in order to promote the common good."60 
In addition, Aquinas argued that it is one's moral duty to make known 
any evidence that would prevent the condemnation of the innocent.61 The 
obligation to provide exonerating evidence is so strong that it obligates re-
vealing secrets: 
But as regards matters committed to man by some other means 
under secrecy, we must make a distinction. For sometimes they 
are of such a nature that one is bound to make them known as 
soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they conduce 
to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to 
some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is 
bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denounc-
ing it . . .. On the other hand sometimes they are such as one is 
not bound to make known . . . .62 
Thus Aquinas argued that it is evil to keep secret what can save the com-
mon good or individuals from harm. Public office does not excuse one from 
this obligation, especially since public authority derives from the common 
good63 and since the obligation to honor the common good is a moral 
obligation. 64 
by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common 
good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to 
slay the innocent. 
59. ld. at ad 2. 
60. ld. at q. 68 a. 3. 
61. ld. at q. 70 a. 1: 
[I]f his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an unjust death or any other 
penalty, or from false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give evi-
dence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare 
the truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written (Ps. lxxxi. 4): Rescue the 
poor, and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner; and (Prov. xxiv. II): Deliver 
them that are led to death; and (Rom. i. 32): They are worthy of death, not only they that 
do them, but they also that consent to them that do them, on which words a gloss says: 
To be silent when one can disprove is to consent. 
62. ld. at q. 70 a. 1, ad 2. 
63. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part I of the Second Part, at q. 90 a. 2-3; see also id. at q. 96 a. 6. 
64. The moral nature of the obligation to honor the common good is the reason why Aquinas 
argues not only that the common good is greater than the individual good, but also that the last end 
of every human's life is a happiness identical with the common good. ld. atq. 90 a. 2. Aquinas 
considers human rationality to be such that it prefers the greater good to the lesser, e.g., reason 
judges that education is better than the fantasies induced by heroin. 
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Must we then morally condemn the judge who fails to reveal what he 
or she knows to be true? Must we then also conclude that Aquinas contra-
dicted his own natural law jurisprudence when he claimed that the judge 
who can neither recuse himself, nor remit the case to a higher court, nor fail 
to pass sentence, nor make known the defendant's innocence. can morally 
sentence the innocent to death? Before we convict Aquinas of such blatant 
inconsistency, we should note that there is one case-and only one case-
in which the judge may never bring his private information concerning a 
person's innocence into the courtroom: when the judge is a Catholic priest 
and his information was gained under the seal of confession. The secrets of 
the confessional are God's-not man's. As such, God's rights demand that 
the priest never reveals in any way the information gained through confes-
sion.65 Indeed, the Catholic Church in its revised Canon Law of 1983 still 
prohibits compromising the confessional seal.66 
Thus, if the clerical judge were to acquit on the basis of information 
gained under the sacramental seal, that seal would be violated. Accordingly, 
when a clerical judge has no option but to try a case without giving any sign 
of the defendant's innocence, and when the testimony of false witnesses 
cannot be shaken, the principle of double effect would permit the clerical 
judge to render judgment in accord with the testimony given in court while 
intending only the preservation of confessional seal. For in such cases, the 
sentence of the clerical jurist has two inseparable effects: the good effect of 
protecting God's secrets and the evil effect of condemning the innocent. 
But the principles of double effect and material cooperation permit this 
sentencing only on the assumption that capital punishment is not intrinsi-
cally evil. If it were, it would never be moral to issue a capital sentence. But 
within Catholic social thought, capital punishment has not been identified 
as intrinsically evil. Aquinas, for instance, argued: "[Human justice] puts to 
death those who are dangerous to others."67 The moral permissibility of 
capital punishment as a defensive measure, moreover, was acknowledged 
by John Paul II in his argument that contemporary penal institutions tend to 
make capital punishment irrelevant as a defensive measure.68 
65. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 70 a. 1, ad 2 (UA man should by no 
means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such 
things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more binding than any human 
precept."). 
66. THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY 691 (James A. Coriden, Thomas 
J. Green & Donald E. Heintschel, eds., Paulist Press 1986) (Canon 983.1: 'The sacramental seal is 
inviolable; therefore, it is a crime for a confessor in any way to betray a penitent by word or in any 
other manner or for any reason." Canon 984.2: "One who is placed in authority can in no way use 
for external governance knowledge about sins which he has received in confession at any time."). 
67. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part II of the Second Part, at q. 64 a. 2, ad 2. 
68. Pope John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae, supra note 5, at Nos. 55-56, pp. 98-100. 
Moreover, "legitimate defence can be not only a right but a grave duty for someone 
responsible for another's life, the common good of the family or of the State". Unfortu-
nately it happens that the need to render the aggressor incapable of causing harm some-
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This extremely rare case where a clerical judge is caught between 
God's rights and the defendant's is the only case that permits a judge to 
knowingly-and unintentionally-sentence the innocent to death; for only 
the confessional seal is able to forbid a judge from revealing his knowledge 
of the person's innocence. In all other cases, knowingly sentencing an inno-
cent to death would involve not only the culpable failure to find a way to 
exonerate the innocent, but also the wicked intention to execute the inno-
cent. Mter all, as Aquinas pointed out, if this were not the case, those who 
condemned the martyrs and those who executed them would not be 
culpable.69 
The practice of clerics issuing capital sentences was condemned in 
1215 by the Fourth Lateran Counci1.70 Since this prohibition followed the 
prohibition of clerics from assuming secular duties by the Third Lateran 
Council in 1179,71 clerical judges became able to issue only ecclesiastical 
times involves taking his life. In this case, the fatal outcome is attributable to the 
aggressor whose action brought it about, even though he may not be morally responsible 
because of a lack of the use of reason. 
This is the context in which to place the problem of the death penalty .... The 
primary purpose of the punishment which society inflicts is "to redress the disorder 
caused by the offence .... " 
It is clear that. . . punishment. . . ought not go to the extreme of executing the 
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be 
possible otherwise to defend society. Today however. as a result of steady improve-
ments in the organization of the penal system, such cases are very rare, if not practically 
non-existent. 
(citations and emphasis omitted). 
69. AQUINAS, SUMMA, Part Jl of the Second Part, at q. 64 a. 6, ad 3. 
70. Fourth Lateran Council (1215), canon 18, available at http://www.catholicculture.org/ 
docs!doc_ view .cfm ?recnum=5339. 
Clerics to dissociate from shedding-blood. No cleric may decree or pronounce a sen-
tence involving the shedding of blood, or carry out a punishment involving the same, or 
be present when such punishment is carried out. If anyone, however, under cover of this 
statute, dares to inflict injury on churches or ecclesiastical persons, let him be restrained 
by ecclesiastical censure. A cleric may not write or dictate letters which require punish-
ments involving the shedding of blood, in the courts of princes this responsibility should 
be entrusted to laymen and not to clerics. Moreover no cleric may be put in command of 
mercenaries or crossbow men or suchlike men of blood; nor may anyone confer a rite of 
blessing or consecration on a purgation by ordeal of boiling or cold water or of the red-
hot iron, saving nevertheless the previously promulgated prohibitions regarding single 
combats and duels. 
71. Third Lateran Council (1179), canon 12, available at http://www.catholicculture.org/ 
docs/doc_ view.cfm?recnum=5337. 
Let clerics not presume to take upon themselves the management of towns or even 
secular jurisdiction under princes or seculars so as to become their ministers of justice. 
If anyone dares to act contrary to this decree. and so contrary to the teaching of the 
Apostle who says, No soldier of God gets entangled in secular affairs, and acts as a man 
of this world, let him be deprived of ecclesiastical ministry, on the grounds that neglect-
ing his duty as a cleric he plunges into the waves of this world to please its princes. We 
decree in the strictest tenns that any religious who presumes to attempt any of the 
above-mentioned things should he punished. 
This prohibition struck at the medieval heart of lay investiture where feudal lords would appoint 
abbots and bishops and charge them with the financial, legal, social, and military obligations of 
vassals, e.g., supplying men-at-arms and hosting the lord's traveling parties. Ending lay investiture 
took a tremendous effort especially by four popes, namely, Gregory VII (d. 1085), Urban II (d. 
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sentences prescribing, for instance, prayers, pilgrimages, almsgiving, or ex-
communication in severe cases. Capital sentences were thenceforth issued 
and executed only by secular authorities. 72 
Consequently, it has been centuries since the principle of material co-
operation has permitted clerical judges to protect the seal of confession by 
issuing capital sentences for the innocent. Accordingly, this evil cannot now 
be tolerated by juridical prudence. It is thus not morally permissible for 
contemporary judges to knowingly sentence the innocent to die: to do so 
would intentionally violate the inalienable right to life and attack the socie-
tal common good. Pope John Paul II was very clear on this point: "[C]ivil 
authorities and particular individuals never have the authority to violate the 
fundamental and inviolable rights of the human person.'>73 Quite right, 
Aquinas would have agreed, since juridical authority is ultimately a moral 
authority based on promoting a common good that is protective of individ-
ual well-being and the natural rights whereby one flourishes. Since life is 
not only naturally suitable for human beings, but is also a pre-requisite for 
flourishing, it is evil to intentionally seek the innocent's death. Conse-
quently, the evil of intentionally sentencing the innocent to death can never 
be legitimately authorized: for evil can no more promote good than fire can 
promote ice. 
An analogous but contemporary case involves the witness who could 
exonerate a defendant only by breaking the seal of confession. The analysis 
given here of juridical prudence would permit the priest to remain silent: his 
cooperation in the evil of condemning the innocent would be material and 
worth tolerating considering the obligation to keep God's secrets and the 
greater evils that would befall the legally mandated violation of the confes-
sional seal. Teresa Collett explains that these evils include the subordination 
of church to state, the violation of the penitent's trust (that may well lead to 
his repudiation of religious belief), the betrayal of the Christian belief that 
each person is uniquely important to God regardless of the impact on 
others, the inability to follow the command of Christ to confess one's sins 
without fear of human retaliation, the excommunication of the priest who 
discloses a penitent's secrets, the instantiation of the idea that the only bar-
1099), Innocent II (d. 1143), and Innocent m (d. 1216). See MARSHALL W. BALDWIN, THE MEDI-
AEVAL CHURCH (1953); CHURCH AND STATE THROUGH THE CENTURIES: A COLLE=ION OF HIS-
TORIC DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES (Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morrall trans. & eds., 1954); 
BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1050-1300) (1964). 
72. BALDWIN, supra note 71, at 65. As noted by the internet version of the Catholic Encyclo-
pedia in the topic of "Inquisition," it was not unusual for secular authorities in the middle ages to 
legislate temporal punishments for spiritual offenses. For instance, in 1224, Frederick. II legislated 
"that heretics convicted by an ecclesiastical court shall, on imperial authority, suffer death by 
fire." NewAdvent.org, Catholic Encyclopedia, Inquisition, available at http://www.newadvent. 
orglcathenJ08026a.htrn (last accessed Mar. 27, 2007). For an overview of the medieval world, see 
FRIEDRICH HEER, THE MEDIEVAL WORLD: EUROPE 1100-1350 (Janet Sondheimer trans., 1962) or 
JOHN B. MORRALL, POLmcAL THOUGHT IN MEDIEVAL TIMES (1980). 
73. Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, supra note 50. 
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rier to the world's evils is the human will, the betrayal of the Catholic belief 
that God's grace enables the penitent to reform, and the betrayal of the 
belief that the priest is God's representative-that confession is actually 
between oneself and GodJ4 
Furthermore, justice would not be served by legally obligating priests 
to reveal the secrets of confession: it would wreck havoc with the rules of 
evidence, excessively tangle church and state, and infringe the free exercise 
of religion. Moreover, if revealing such secrets were to become routine and 
if the word of a priest were to suffice for a conviction in a court of law, 
unbearable pressures could be brought against priests to identify scapegoats 
for desperate criminals. Indeed, it would even be possible for the wily crim-
inal to confess to crimes while impersonating another in the hope that the 
other would then be convicted. 
In any case, American jurisprudence defends the right of the priest to 
keep a penitent's secrets on standard First Amendment grounds because 
free exercise demands it.75 God, according to Catholicism, also demands it. 
Accordingly, American jurisprudence and Catholic social teaching concur 
that the sacramental seal of confession is inviolable, especially if it is the 
case that the founders of American democracy passed the First Amendment 
as a way to protect the unsurpassable obligations of those who believed in 
GodJ6 Either way, religious free exercise remains a key parameter of jurid-
ical prudence. 
In conclusion, we have seen that contrary to appearances, Aquinas' 
jurisprudence of the common good is consistent both internally and with the 
jurisprudence of inviolable human rights championed by John Paul II. 
Aquinas and John Paul II agree that the parameters of juridical prudence are 
established by an organic conception of the societal common good that hon-
ors individual well-being, inalienable human rights, and the natural moral 
law. As a result, they agree that the common good is always impermissibly 
attacked by the intentional killing of the innocent. They also agree that al-
though evil may never be intentionally sought, evil may be tolerated-but 
only when greater evils would be mitigated and only when the conditions of 
material cooperation or double effect are met. 
74. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Sacred Secrets or Sanctimonious Silence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. 
REV. 1747 (1995-1996). 
75. Cf. Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983); Anthony Merlino, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the Catholic 
Confessional From Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON HALL L. REv. 655 (2002); 
Julie Ann Sippel, Priest-Penitent Privilege Statutes: Dual Protection in the Confessional, 43 
CATH. U. L. REv. 1127 (Summer 1994); Faye A. Silas, Embattled Clergy: Is Confession Always 
Private?, A.B.A. J. 36 (Feb. 1986); and Charles Toutant, Defense Tries New Tactic to Suppress 
Murder Confession to Trooper/Cleric, 6111/2001 N.J. L.I. 7 (June II, 2(01). 
76. R. Mary Hayden Lemmons, Tolerance, Society, and the First Amendment: Reconsidera-
tions, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.I. 75 (2005); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Un-
derstanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1990). 
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Detennining whether a certain set of contingencies meets, or fails to 
meet, the conditions for the principles of material cooperation and double 
effect requires determining whether the act in question is intrinsically evil: 
whether the evil effect is directly intended, whether the evil effect is a 
means for establishing the good effect, whether the evil effect outweighs 
the good effect, and whether the act in question is a last resort. Making 
these determinations requires the public official as well as the citizen to rely 
on objective morality, that is, the natural law. The natural law establishes 
not only the authoritative and obligatory character of human law, but also 
the parameters of juridical prudence, which include the organic and societal 
common good. This good in tum includes honoring fundamental human 
rights, including the right to life, the right to avoid formally cooperating in 
evil, the right of conscientious objection, and the right to religious free ex-
ercise whereby one discharges one's unsurpassable duties to God, including 
any pertaining to the sacrament of confession. 
In brief, the parameters of juridical prudence set by the natural law 
jurisprudence of Aquinas and John Paul II require both citizens and state 
officials to pursue the common good and protect human rights, while toler-
ating only those unintentional evils identified as unavoidable by the princi-
ple of double effect. 
